tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7845033387261056543.post3018020257759742587..comments2023-03-25T09:22:39.413-04:00Comments on The Silver Skeptic: Word Play Part III: PhilosophistryZaqhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/09981240468406712287noreply@blogger.comBlogger4125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7845033387261056543.post-8796474930962645012011-05-09T20:03:19.825-04:002011-05-09T20:03:19.825-04:00Post 2: P1
I did a bit more thinking about this. ...Post 2: P1<br />I did a bit more thinking about this. The problem I have with working properties into the definition of an electon is that when electron refers to "that thing we observed," then it exists (after all, we observed it). Once you add properties in, the definition is too functionally similar to "an electron is a particle with this charge and this mass, which exists." I wanted to avoid anything like that.<br /><br />Also, the definition I gave does include properties. The properties are just left as variables because at the time, physicists didn't know what those properties were.<br /><br />Besides, physicists all understood what "electron" refered to well before they figured out it's charge and mass. The definition served its purpose (everyone knew what the other people were talking about), so what's the problem?<br /><br />P2: This sounds like what I did. I treated the properties as variables because we didn't know what they were at the time we needed to define "electron."<br /><br />Wow, I'm also long-winded. We should team up and defeat the opposition through sheer volume.Zaqhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09981240468406712287noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7845033387261056543.post-43870276736747326602011-05-09T19:50:40.839-04:002011-05-09T19:50:40.839-04:00Wow, you sure write a lot. I'll parse paragra...Wow, you sure write a lot. I'll parse paragraph by paragraph.<br /><br />P1: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genetic_fallacy<br />Also I don't think philosophy is entirely useless. I think a more accurate assessment would be to say that it is quite inefficient.<br /><br />P2: Invalid by what standard? The second approach seems to be a precurser to the first. You have to think about how you want to define things before you actually define them. The issue is that philosophers seem stuck on the second approach and rarely make it to the first approach.<br /><br />P3: If it is a subjective claim, then there seem to be a lot of people who agree. How many philosophers will say that their opposition is wrong, as opposed to saying that their opposition has poor definitions? It's the difference between saying "your definition of mind is not useful" and saying "the brain is not the mind" simply because it doesn't meet some criteria that wasn't in your opposition's definition of "mind" in the first place. The latter makes it seem like there's an agreed upon definition of "mind" when there isn't.<br /><br />P4: The problem then is that philosophers seem to still be in the early stages of most everything. How many centuries have philosophers discussed morality without agreeing on a definition of the word "good?" Again, it's not a worthless discussion, it's just taking waaaaay too long. And I think a part of it is the fact that philosophers rarely admit that they're hashing out definitions.<br /><br />More P4: The lack of a total classification of topological properties did not prevent mathematicians from agreeing on a definition for topology. Dark matter is an even better example. Physicists all share a common definition of dark matter, it's basically "that excess mass between what we calculate from theories of gravity and what we see." This despite the fact the we know very little about any properties such matter might have. What is preventing philosophers from reaching a definition from a very small set of known properties like physicists and mathematicians do?<br /><br />P5: I'm not not making any of those assumptions. I'm just saying that they don't disagree with known facts about the working of the brain. Thus, two people who agree that the brain causes feeling but does not itself feel can still write volumes debating whether or not hte brain is the mind, even though they agree on the "nature of things."Zaqhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09981240468406712287noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7845033387261056543.post-1413577049046717742011-05-08T16:44:48.431-04:002011-05-08T16:44:48.431-04:00I'd also like to comment on our earlier (and r...I'd also like to comment on our earlier (and related) discussion on definitions containing properties. I agree with you that existence should not be part of a definition, but I strongly disagree with your assertion that you should not have properties in a definition. A definition of X IS a list of properties of X. To talk about X without ascribing some properties to it means that you have no definition. Your example that you define an electron as 'that thing we observed' without making properties part of the definition is a good illustration. When you are communicating with someone who is unfamiliar with an electron, 'that thing we observed' is utterly useless as a definition for a very simple reason: You could be talking about ANYTHING. 'A subatomic particle with negative charge and half-integer spin' is one thing that fits your definition, but so do 'that door we walked in through,' 'that cat over there,' and 'the sun.' A definition must include properties of the thing it defines; that's the whole point.<br /><br />This should not be construed as a claim that we should pick a definition and stick with it without changing it. It seems to me that there is a perfectly reasonable approach to take that allows for properties being part of definitions. You can observe something new and give it an identifier D that defines it to include properties X, Y, and Z. However, some of those properties are likely quite tentative. You just observed D, there hasn't been much study done on it. Those properties might turn out to be wrong, and then can be updated or modified as new information about D is found. Or further study might confirm them and they can then be solidified until and unless new information disproves them.Surramnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7845033387261056543.post-56354958358314082642011-05-08T16:44:17.099-04:002011-05-08T16:44:17.099-04:00Zaq, there are a number of problems with your case...Zaq, there are a number of problems with your case.<br /><br />First, I'd point out that philosophy is the womb of the sciences. If you asked most ancient (and even not-so-ancient) 'scientists' what their profession was, they would say 'philosophy'. Your own discipline of physics was once called 'natural philosophy.' Many of the natural sciences started as clusters of ideas in philosophy and later split off to become science once more information and more tools were available. This phenomena is not limited to ancient philosophy becoming science, it happens in the present as well: Philosophy has and still does contributed to psychology and neurosciences. <br /><br />Secondly, you are assuming that philosophical works must follow a single framework in which a proposed definition for X is given initially, and then is used to argue than A, B, and C follow, or that the proposed definition X seems to track reality. I agree that approach is sometime used and I have no objection to it. However, another approach I have run into is what I will term the 'musing' approach in which a philosopher effectively 'thinks out loud' (or in text) and by evaluating his thoughts in a logical framework tries to hammer down a definition of X. This approach too seems valid.<br />Also, your claim that "I saw plenty of discussion that amounted to hashing out definitions, but it was always couched in language that worked to disguise that fact." is a subjective judgment. Can you provide examples of philosophers that provides a definition while attempting to hide the fact that that is what they are doing? Even if so, a definition (however phrased) is provided, so what's the issue?<br /><br />Regarding your example of philosophers arguing what 'mind' is, I think you are committing a fallacy that you yourself have attacked in the past. The fact that we don't at present know what a 'mind' is does not in any way imply that the discussion of 'What is mind?' is not worth having or that study is not warranted. Your claim that 'we don't know all the properties' being different from 'we have not common definition' is true, but irrelevant in context. In this case, we don't know all (or even many) of the properties of 'mind' THEREFORE we have no single accepted definition. Philosophers are still in the stage of asking questions and formulating ideas of what a 'mind' is, then sharing them with others, getting feedback, hearing colleagues ideas, and modifying their initial view of 'mind' as new ideas and information come in. Your assertion that "I’m not complaining that philosophers of mind don’t have the whole mind thing figured out yet. I’m complaining that they don’t even seem to have a common referent for the word 'mind.'" is also a red herring. As I have noted, philosophers are still in the very early stages of figuring out what a 'mind' is and thus don't have a single common definition.<br /><br />Your issues with the question 'Is mind = brain?' are based on unstated assumptions that don't seem to be obviously true. Namely your paragraph "One (of several)...does not experience." claims that "I am the one feeling happy, not my brain." It also mentions the brain as causer of mental phenomena but not experiencer of such and that "the brain is not itself the mind because it does not experience." These claims rely on assumptions that selfhood (I, me) can be distinguished from a some particular brain/mind function or state. If 'self' is a component of your mind and brain = mind the it is not wrong to say that your brain (or at least a part of it) IS happy. You also assume that your brain is either the causer or experiencer of mental phenomena, but not both. This is also not necessarily true.<br /><br />As an aside, I would be interested in which philosopher's work on 'Is brain=mind?' you were referring to, as I question your reading of it on other points as well.Surramnoreply@blogger.com